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822 KELLETT t'. SUPERIOR COURT 
[Sac. No. 7689. In Bank. Jan. 5,1966.] 
ELMER GORDON KELLETT, Petitioner, v. THE SU-
PERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Re-
spondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 
[1J 
[2] 
Criminal Law - Punishment - Double Punishment. - Where ' 
only a single act or an indivisible course of criminal conduct is 
charged as the basis for a conviction, defendant can be pun-
ished only once though he violated more than one statute. 
\Vhether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore 
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of Pen. 
Code, § 654, precluding double punishment, dppends on the in-
tent and objective of the actor. 
Wea.pons-Included Offenses.-Xeither the brandishing of a 
gun, a misdemeanor proscribed by Pen. Codt', § 417, nor the 
possession by an ex-felon of a pistol capable of being concealed, 
a felony pl'o~cribed by § 12021, is an offense necessarily in-
cluded within the other. 
[8] Indictment and Information-Joinder of Counts-Purpose of 
Statutes.-By amendments to Pen. Code, § 954, the Legislature :;: 
has demonstrated its purpose to require joinder of related of-"'\' ,i~ 
[4] 
[5] 
fenses in a single prosecution. In addition to preventing harass-
ment, such joinder avoids needless repetition of evidence and 
saves the state and defendant time and money . 
Id.-Joinder of Counts-Misdemeanors and Felonies. - Pen. 
Code, § 954, does not distinguish felonies and misdemeanors in 
its joinder provisions and therefore authorizes joinder of mis-
demeanor and felony counts in a prosecution in the superior 
court. (Disapproving People v. Rodt';guez, 202 Cal.App.2d 191 
[20 Cal.Rptr. 556], insofar as it is inc.onsistent.) 
Criminal Law-Multiple ProsecutionB.-Some acts divisible for 
the purpose of punishment must be regarded as being too inter-
related to permit their being prosecuted successively, and when 
there is a course of conduct involving several physical acts, the 
actor's intent or objective and the number of victims involved, 
which are crucial in determining the permissible punishment, 
may be inlmaterial when successive prosecutions are attempted. 
[1] 'See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 269. 
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d. Indictment and Information, § 73; Am.Jur., 
Inrlictments and Informa'tions (1st ed § 133). 
McK. Dig. References: [1,8] Criminal Law, § 1475; [2] Weapons, 
*~ 5,7; [3] Indictment and Information, § 70; [4] Indictment and 
Information, § 70; Criminal Law, § 144; [5] Criminal Law, § 66.5; 
[6] Criminal Law, § 66.5; Weapons, §§5, 7; [7,9] Criminal Law, 
~~ 66.5, 1475. 
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[6] ld.-Multiple Prosecutions: Weapons-Included 01renses.-
When, as in the case of an accused's brandishing a gun in vio-
lation of Pen. Code, § 417, and his possession as an ex-felon 
of a deadly weapon capable of concealment in violation of 
§ 12021, the prOl~e('ution ill or should be aware of more than one 
offense in which the same act or course of conduct plaYR a 
significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single 
proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permitted 
for good cause. Failure to unite them will bar subsequent 
prosecution of any offense omitted where the initial proceed. 
ings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence. 
(Disapproving Pcople Y. Wilsoll, 224 Cal.App.2d 738 [37 Clll. 
Rptr. 42], insofar as it is inconsistent.) 
[7] ld.-Multiple Prosecutions: Punishment-Double PunishmE'nt. 
-Where felonies and misdemeanors are prosecuted by diffeJ" 
ent public law offices and the misdemeanor prosecution pro-
ceeds without adequate assessment of the seriousness of de-
fendant's conduct, or where a well·advised defendant pleads 
guilty to a misdemeanor to foreclose a felony prosecution by 
II. different public law office, or where the prosecutor is reason-
ably unaware of defendant's felonies at the time his misde-
meanors are prosecuted, the risk of waste and harassment 
through both misdemeanor and felony prosecutions may be 
outweighed by the risk of a felon's escaping proper punish-
ment; in such cases, Pen. Code, § 654, does not bar a subse-
quent felony prosecution except to the extent that it is barre<1 
by that section's preclusion of multiple punishment. 
[8] ld.-Punishment-Double Punishment.-The risk that a felon 
may escape proper punishment as the result of a conviction of 
a lesser offense is inherent in the preclusion by Pen. Code, 
§ 654, of multiple punishment. 
[9] ld.-Multiple Prosecutions: Punishment-Double Punishment. 
-Where an act or course of criminal conduct can be punished 
only once under Pen. Code, § 654, either an acquittal or convic-
tion and sentence under one penal statute will preclude subse-
quent prosecution in a separate proceeding under any other 
pennI statute. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County from prosecuting petitioner on 
a felony charge. Writ granted. 
Kenneth M. Wells, Public DefJnder, and Michael S. Sands, 
Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
" 
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Thomas 'C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Attor-
lley General, for Real Party in Interest. 
. TRAYNOR, C. J.-On October 15, 1964, officers of the 
Sacramento Police Department, called to the scene of a dis-
turbance, arrested petitioner who was standing on a public 
sidewalk with a pistol in his hand. On that day he was 
charged in the municipal court with committing a misde- l 
meanor in violation of Penal Code section 417 (exhibiting a 
firearm in a threatening manner). On November 17, 1964,' 
after a preliminary hearing at which it appeared that peti-
tioner had been convicted of a felony, he was charged by 
information in the superior court with committing a felony 
in violation of Penal Code section 12021 (possession of a 
concealable weapon by a person who has been convicted of a 
felony). 
On January 20, 1965, petitioner pleaded guilty to the 
charge of violating section 417 and was sentenced to 90 days 
in the county jail. On January 26, 1965, he moved in the 
superior court to dismiss the information charging a viola-
tion of section 12021 on the ground that it was barred by 
Penal Code section 654.1 The motion was denied, and peti-
tioner now seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial. 
Petitioner contends that exhibiting and possessing the 
pistol constituted a single act and that therefore his prosecu-
tion for violating section 12021 is barred by his conviction of .11 
'\iola~ing section 417. The Attorney General contends that i 
even if the evidence at petitioner's preliminary hearing did i 
not show possession apart from that involved in the section 
417 violation, it is reasonable to infer that petitioner pos-
sessed the pistol for. some time before exhibiting it and that 
at his trial a separate act of possession within the meaning of 
section 654 may be readily established. 
[1] If only a single act or an indivisible course of crimi-
nal conduct is charged as the basis for a conviction, the 
defendant,can be punished only once although he may have 
violated more than one statute. Whether a course of criminal 
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one 
I 
ISection 654 provides: II An act or omission which is made punishable 
in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no ease can it be punished under 
more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one 
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other." 
/ 
'J 
l.rEr..t.oETT f). SUPERIOR COURT 
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act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent 
and objective of the actor. (Neal v. State of California, 55 
Ca1.2d 11, 19 I9 Cal.Rptr. 607,357 P.2d 839].) 
[2] Penal Code section 954 provides for the joinder in a 
single accusatory pleading of two or more offenses connected 
in their commission or having a common element of substan-
tial importance in tneir commission. (Peop'le v.Bcott, 24 
Cal.2d 774, 778-779 [151 P.2d 517].) Had both offenses been 
joined in a single prosecution, the People might have shown 
that the object and intent of the petitioner in brandishing 
the weapon and his object in possessing it were entirely unre-
lated. The People might also have shown that the petitioner's 
possession of the weapon extended to a time beyond that 
during which he was observed brandishing it. If both were 
proved, the tests set forth in Neal for distinguishing a divisi-
ble transaction would be met and punishment for each offense 
permitted.1I 
We pointed out in Neal, however, that "Section 654's pre-
clusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinct from 
its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against mul-
tiple prosecutions. is a procedural safeguard against harass-
ment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be 
imposed; double prosecution may be precluded even when 
double punishment is permissible." (Neal .v. State of Cali-
fornia, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) 
Thus, the punishment clause of section 654 does not apply 
when a single act of violence causes injury to several persons. 
A defendant who blows up an airplane killing all on board or . 
commits an act that injures many persons is properly subject 
to greater punishment than a defendant who kills or harms 
only a single person. It does not follow, however, that such a 
defendant should be liable to successive prosecutions. It 
would constitute wholly unreasonable harassment in such cir-
cumstances to permit trials seriatim until the prosecutor is 
IISinee neither the o:ifense proseribed by seetion 417, nor that pro· 
aeribed by section 12021 is neeessarily ineluded within the other, either 
as defined in those sections or as pleaded agamst the petitioner (People 
v. MarahoJl, 48 Ca1.2d 394 [309 P.2d 456]), his prosecution for violating 
section 12021 is not barred by the prohibition agamst double jeopardy. 
(Cal. Const., art. I, '13; Pen. Code, 11023.) If one o:ifense cannot be 
committed without necessarily committing another, the l&tter is aneces· 
sarily ineluded o:ifense. (People v. Greer, SO Ca1.2d 589 (184 P.2d 512].) 
A violation of aeetion 417 can be committed without violating section 
12021, and a violation of section 12021 can be committed without violat· 
ing section 417. 
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satisfied with the punishment imposed. (3, 4] Bya series 
of amendments to section 954 tIlat have greatly expanded the' 
scope of permissible joinder, the Legislature has demon-' 
strated its purpose to require joinder of related offenses in a 
single prosecution.- In addition to preventing harassment, 
joinder avoids needless repetition of evidence and saves the 
state and the defendant time and money.· (PeopZe v. 8cott, 
24 Ca1.2d 774, 779 [151 P.2d 517J; Neal v. State of Cali-
fornia, supra, at p. 21. See also A.L.I. Model Penal Code, 
Tent. Draft No.5, com. p. 34; Remington & Joseph, Oharg-
ing, Oonvicting and Sentencing the Multiple Oriminal Offend-
er, 1961 Wis.L.Rev. 528, 551-552; Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis 
Vezari: New Trials and Successive Prosecuti{)ns, 74 Harv.L. 
Rev. 1; Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeop-
ardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 525; Comments, 50 Cal.L.Rev. 853; 11 
Stan.L.Rev. 735, 65 Yale L.J. 339.) 
There has been growing concern that both criminal defend-
ants and the public fisc are entitled to protection from succes-
sive prosecutions for closely related crimes. In 1961 the State 
of Illinois adopted a new criminal code that requires joinder 
of all known offenses based on the same act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1963, ch. 38, par. 3-3.) This requirement significantly alters 
Illinois law that had permitted successive trials of a defend-
ant for each of three murders committed at one time until 
ultimately the death penalty was imposed. (People v. Ciucci, 
'Section 954 does not distinguish felonies and misdemeanors in its provi-
sions for joinder. It therefore authorizes the joinder of a misdemeanor 
count and a felony count in a prosecution in the superior court. (Pe02'Ze V. 
Bundte, 87 Ca1.App.2d 735, 744 [197 P.2d 823].) To the extent that it is 
inconsistent with this opinion, People v. Rodriguez, 202 Cal.App.2d 191 
[20 Cal.Rptr. 556], is disapproved . 
• The needless harassment and waste of time and money of both the 
state and the defense arising from separate trials of closely related of· 
fenses is forcefully illustrated by People v. MajQf'8, 65 Cal 138 [3 P. 597, 
52 Am.St.Rep. 295]. Majors counseled and advised another to commit a 
robbery durine the course of which two persons were killed. Although the 
killings occurred at the same time and the same' evidence established 
that Majors was guilty of murder for each killing, he was separately tried 
and convicted of each crime. At that time, however, section 954 of the 
Penal Code provided that an indictment or information could charge only 
one offense. Accordingly, to insure that Majors could be punished for 
both murders, it was necessary for the court to hold that Majors' trial 
and conviction for the murder of one victim did not bar an essentially 
repetitive trial and conviction for the murder of the other victim. Since 
section 954 now provides that an II accusatory pleading may charge two 
or more different offenses connected together in their commission," there 
is no longer any justification for repetitive trials such as those sanctioned 
in the MajQf" case. 
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8 Ill.2d 619 [137 N.E.3d 40].) The United States Supreme 
Court, although affirming that conviction, clearly warned 
that prosecution of closely related individual offenses at sepa-
rate trials may constitute an impermissible denial of that 
fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Oiucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 
575 [78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983]. See also Hoag v. New 
J~rsey, 356 U.S 464, 467 [78 8.0t. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913J ; see 
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 [79 8.0t. 666, 3 
L.Ed.2d 729] [Brennan, J., concurring].) Applying its new 
statute, the Illinois Supreme Court recently ruled that it is· 
inconsistent with fundamental fairness to try defendants 
previously convicted of murder for the essentially simul-
taneous murder of another victim. The court emphasized that 
the state could have had no other motive for the second prose-
cution than to substitute the opinion of the prosecutor for 
that of the original jury as to the adequacy of the punish-
ment. (People v. Golson, 32 Il1.2d 398 [207 N.E.2d 68].) 
[6] If needless harassment and the waste of public funds 
are to be avoided, some acts that are divisible for the purpose 
of punishment must be regarded as being too interrelated to 
permit their being prosecuted successively. When there is a 
course of conduct involving several physical acts, the actor's 
intent or objective and the number of victims involved, which 
are crucial in determining the permissible punishment, may 
be immaterial when successive prosecutions are attempted. 
[6] When, as here, the prosecution is or should be aware of 
more than one offense in which the same act or course of 
conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be 
prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited 
or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all 
such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of 
any offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in 
either acquittal or conviction and sentence.1I 
[7] We recognize that in many p1acesfelonies and mis-
demeanors are usually prosecuted by different public law 
offices and that there is a risk that those in charge of misde-
meanor pr~cutions may proceed without adequately assess-
ing the seriousness of a defendant's conduct or considering 
whether a felony prosecution should be undertaken. When 
liTo the extent that PeopZe v. Wa8on, 224 Cal.App.2d 738 [87 Cal.Rptr. 
U], is inconsistent with this conclusion it is disapproved. 
) 
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the responsibility for the prosecution for the higher offeriS; 
lies with a different public law office there is also the risk 
that a well advised defendant may plead guilty to a misde~ 
meanor to foreclose a subsequent felony prosecution the 
misdemeanor prosecutor may be unaware of or may choose to 
ignore. Cases may also arise in which the district attorney is 
reasonably unaware of the felonies when the misdemeanors 
are prosecuted. In such situations the risk that there maybe 
waste and harassment through both a misdemeanor and 
felony prosecution may be outweighed by the risk that a 
defendant guilty of a felony may escape proper punishment. 
Accordingly, in such cases section 654 does not bar a subse-
quent felony prosecution except to the extent that such prose-· 
cution is barred by that section's preclusion of multiple 
punishment. 
[8] It bears emphasis, however, that the risk that a 
defendant guilty of a felony may escape proper punishment 
as a result of a conviction of a lesser offense is inherent in the 
preclusion by section 654 of multiple punishment. [9] Thus, . 
if an act or course of criminal conduct can be punished 
only once under section 654, either an acquittal or conviction 
and sentence under one penal statute will preclude subse-
quent prosecution in a separate proceeding under any other 
penal statute. (People v. Tideman, 57 Cal.2d 574, 587 [21 
Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007].) A conviction and sentence 
for petty theft would therefore bar a subsequent prosecution 
for burglary of premises entered with intent to comInit that 
theft, since only a single act within the meaning of section 
654 would be involved. (People v. McFarZand, 58 Cal.2d 748, 
762 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].) Essentially the same 
risk exists under the doctrine of double jeopardy, for a 
conviction or acquittal of a lesser included offense is a bar to 
a subsequent prosecution for the greater including offense. 
(People v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 597 [184 P.2d -512] ; People 
v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [149 P.2d 416].) Accord-
ingly, to avoid these risks it has always been necessary for 
prosecutors carefully to assess the seriousness of a defend-
ant's crimi~al conduct before determining what charges 
should be prosecuted against him. By emphasizing the impor-
tance of such assessment, our holding herein will not open 
the door to the escape of defendants from punishment for 
serious crimes because of convictions or acquittals of closely 
related minor crimes. It should tend instead to reduce the 
) 
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risk that they may escape such punishment by invoking the 
double jeopardy doctrine or the bar of section 654. 
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
McComb, J.,Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., 
and Burke, J., concurred. 
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing 
was denied February 2, 1966, and the opinion was modified 
to read as printed above. 
